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ABSTRACT: Recent discussions in health reform circles have pinned great hopes on the
prospect of innovation as the solution to the high-cost, inadequate-quality U.S. health sys-
tem. But U.S. health care institutions—insurers, providers, and specialists—have ceded
leadership in innovation to Indian hospitals such as Care Hospital in Hyderabad and the
Fortis Hospitals around New Delhi, which have U.S.-trained doctors and can perform open
heart surgery for $6,000 (compared to $100,000 in the United States). The Indian success
is a window into America’s stalemate with inflating costs and stagnant innovation. [Health
Affairs 27, no. 5 (2008): 1260–1270; 10.1377/hlthaff.27.5.1260]
A
s ign in the fort i s e scorts heart inst itute and Research Centre
in New Delhi encapsulates the starkest difference between Indian hospi-
tals and their U.S. counterparts: to celebrate “Heart Month,” Fortis an-
nounced a “10% discount on PTCA (Angioplasty) & CABG (Bypass Surgery).”1
The recent rise of India’s middle class has meant the emergence of several mil-
lion new health care consumers looking to opt out of India’s free public hospitals
and instead pay for private health care services. Accordingly, India has seen a rise
of private hospitals catering to these consumers in the emerging cash-pay market
for hospital care. Care Hospital facilities around Hyderabad, the network of Fortis
Hospitals around New Delhi, and many other private hospitals are targeting the
300 million Indians who count themselves among the nation’s middle class.
India presents a stark contrast to the United States. The nation’s entire health
sector is estimated to be $20 billion in size (compared to $2.3 trillion in the United
States), with more than 80 percent coming from private resources. Fewer than 14
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percent of Indians purchase health insurance, and with a national per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) of US$820, Indian hospitals understand that their ser-
vices have to meet the middle-class family budget, even for major surgery. Thus,
Fortis Hospitals charges $6,000 for open-heart surgery. Care Hospital charges
slightly less. Narayana Hrudayalaya (NH) Heart Hospital in Bangalore, a charita-
ble hospital, charges just over $2,000.2 Meanwhile, open-heart surgery at a U.S. re-
search hospital typically bills at more than $100,000. Despite the price difference,
private Indian hospitals provide world-class service: doctors with training com-
parable to that of U.S. physicians (many with medical training in the United
States), the latest technology and equipment, and infection and mortality rates
that compare to those of U.S. hospitals.
Why is there such a difference in costs for services with similar outcomes? To
be sure, lower labor costs in India play an important role. But much of the Indian
success can be attributed to experimenting with, developing, and constantly im-
proving innovative organizational structures to provide care. At the extreme,
these structures offer textbook examples of organizational innovation, and they
suggest what might be possible if the U.S. health care market were permitted to
experiment with new organizational forms.
Organizational Innovation And The Health Sector
Recent discussions in health reform circles have pinned great hopes on the
prospect of innovation as the solution to the high-cost, inadequate-quality U.S.
health system. Clay Christensen, using the template from his popular The Innova-
tor’s Dilemma, has helped spark the optimism by encouraging “disruptive innova-
tion” to transform the U.S. health sector.3 This model of change has entrants chal-
lenging industry leaders with low-cost technologies that, over time, achieve
similar or better performance than the existing standard. As these entrants sup-
plant incumbents, they force market participants—and often the market struc-
ture itself—to undergo organizational change, and this transformation creates
value for both innovators and consumers.
Accordingly, much of the literature on organizational innovation looks to en-
trants, rather than incumbents, to drive innovation and to catalyze incumbent
firms to respond.4 Most innovation-intensive industries thus regularly undergo
major changes, including wholesale cycling of industry leadership.5 But the U.S.
health sector has been strikingly ossified, with the same industry leaders (aca-
demic hospitals and university medical centers) that led a generation or more ago
continuing to hold leadership status today. Disruptive innovation is fueled by en-
trants, yet the U.S. health care market has managed to either exclude or cripple re-
alistic challenges posed by newcomers with innovative organizational forms.
In this paper we explore the organizational innovations that have emerged in In-
dian hospitals out of India’s competitive and more open marketplace, and we dis-
cuss features of the U.S. regulatory environment that impede similar innovation.
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Indian Innovations
India is a land of stark contrasts, with a heterogeneous health care delivery sys-
tem and 1.2 billion people who exhibit vast health disparities. For example, India’s
lowest wealth quintile has a mortality rate for children under age five that is three
times that of the highest wealth quintile, and a measles immunization rate of less
than half.6 Similar disparities exist in the quality of health care offered by India’s
hospitals. While India’s public hospitals have struggled, the private health sector
has seen an explosion of interest concurrent with the country’s economic growth.
Two-thirds of Indian households rely on private medical care, a preference that
appears to cut across classes, and even rural and paramedic care are dominated by
the private sector.7 Although India’s elite institutions now rival top Western hos-
pitals in quality (and have attracted a sizable number of Western patients, while
garnering much media attention), these private systems were designed for and are
geared to the health needs of India’s middle class—and thus target the Indian mid-
dle-class budget—with the public sector serving as a safety-net provider.8 This is
not a system designed for equity, but it is one in which world-class capacity has
developed in a short period in the private sector.
To explore how India’s health-sector innovations have achieved such high qual-
ity, high volume, and affordability, we focus on its heart hospitals and other pri-
vate hospitals that specialize in open-heart surgery and angioplasty. Heart disease
is one of the most common illnesses in India, with approximately 2.4 million peo-
ple needing heart surgery every year, and heart hospitals such as Care Hospital in
Hyderabad and the Fortis Hospitals in New Delhi now perform large volumes of
procedures at high success rates.9 We examined these hospitals as leaders in this
growth, seeking to extract lessons both for U.S. hospitals and for policymakers.
These hospitals illustrate how Indian health care providers have focused on a par-
ticular high-demand service, built a large capacity to provide that service at an af-
fordable cost, and developed assorted organizational innovations to support its
business model.
 Management structure of hospitals. Many of the leading innovative health
care organizations in India are led by dynamic physician-executives. For example,
across its more than ten hospitals, Care Hospital develops physician leadership at
each facility with a “servant leadership” model that empowers physician-led initia-
tives. Likewise, physicians and senior administrators at Fortis view themselves as a
collaborative leadership partnership. This model enables “owner-operator” innova-
tions that are agile and patient-focused.
Also within hospital management teams are managers with experience in In-
dia’s burgeoning hotel industry. The application of management routines and ca-
pabilities from the hotel industry helps Fortis and other hospitals manage patient
care in the context of customers’ experiences and patients’ expectations. This re-
flects a much more focused customer/patient approach than that at many U.S.
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counterpart hospitals.
 Price discrimination by service providers. In a market where hospitals com-
pete on both price and quality, many Indian health care delivery organizations have
adopted the practice of price discrimination (differential pricing) to target multiple
segments of the ever-changing Indian population. Care, for example, has deployed a
“multi-tariff” system for the provision of standard services, charging higher fees for
comparable services to higher-income segments of the patient base. This tiered pric-
ing model is one of the cornerstones of the Care business model, allowing the organi-
zation to provide services either with minimal margins or below full cost (but above
variable cost) to approximately 75 percent of its patients. Other private hospitals
similarly offer more luxurious services for higher prices. There is an explicit focus on
limiting fixed costs to achieve budgetary goals while maintaining quality, so price
discrimination occurs primarily on capital costs and less on technology and ser-
vices. Patients can pay more to enjoy more-elegant rooms, but the technologies used
for procedures are the same for all patients.
Another aspect of price discrimination is hospitals’ explicit targeting of pa-
tients from different income sectors. Fortis targets the upper-middle-class popu-
lation with its price points for services, while Care targets the lower middle class.
Both can make valid claims of high-quality care, so the differences in pricing strat-
egies play out largely in areas not directly related to clinical care. This model is re-
flected in the capital expenditure and facilities strategies of Fortis and Care:
Fortis locates facilities in higher-income neighborhoods across urban areas, while
Care’s strategy includes locating facilities on the periphery of urban areas, in
cheaper real estate markets and closer to its targeted lower-income patients.
These cross-subsidies via price discrimination also contribute greatly to the
hospitals’ innovation. They enable the hospitals to maintain high volume and low
overhead costs and to continually focus on improvement. The sliding-scale pricing
is important because it attracts large numbers of limited-income patients, main-
tains a large volume of consumers, and supports the routines that continually seek
to improve quality and efficiency.
 Quality in a fixed-price model. Competitive pressures are forcing many hos-
pitals in India to offer services with capitated pricing. In a market largely not pene-
trated by insurance coverage, patients as payers are better able to “shop” for medical
procedures by comparing prices in this model, which also shifts financial risk to the
service providers.
Within these emerging fixed pricing schemes, Indian hospitals have managed
to build capital, labor, and systems investment strategies to maximize quality of
care with pricing constraints. Care has described a model of “reverse engineering”
under which the organization starts from the targeted market price for a service
and derives an appropriate cost structure for providing that service with appro-
priate quality. This mechanism facilitates continued evaluation of the cost drivers
for services and provides the market pressure for development of new, innovative
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approaches to care delivery.
The high-quality, low-cost combination requires supporting organizational in-
novation. For instance, a component of Care’s labor strategy for achieving quality
within fixed pricing is the implementation of “de-skilling,” in which Care repack-
ages certain functions of positions that less-trained or lower-level personnel can
perform. Fortis also pursued de-skilling and, for example, developed a program to
train unemployed women from the local community to serve as dialysis techni-
cians. De-skilling not only cuts costs by substituting lower-cost labor when pos-
sible, but it also addresses local labor shortages in skilled and trained personnel.
 Drive for efficiency in supply and delivery chains. In a competitive market
with high fixed costs, the drive for efficiency demands increased production vol-
umes. Many Indian hospitals have responded to these demands by reengineering
their service delivery models to maximize use of capital equipment. An example is
continuous use of radiology equipment at Care, with outpatient studies done by ap-
pointment during the day and inpatient radiology studies done overnight, avoiding
periods of downtime for capital equipment. NH Heart Hospital, meanwhile, has de-
veloped an efficient turnover of operating rooms and cardiac catheterization facili-
ties, allowing for much higher volumes of services with only moderate investment in
capital equipment.
The emphasis on efficiency has also influenced supply-chain management.
There is intense scrutiny of materials management, with efforts to reduce costs of
supplies without compromising quality. For example, Care actively evaluates non-
critical equipment, such as monitors, from lower-price sources such as China, car-
rying out head-to-head, months-long comparisons with more costly global
brands. Care actively deploys these lower-cost technologies across all of its facili-
ties if they meet internal quality standards.
The relentless drive for efficiency and lower cost of care has led Care to develop
and commercialize technologies as an offshoot of its health care delivery business.
Relisys, part of the Care Group (which includes Care Hospitals and Care Founda-
tion), is focused on commercialization of indigenous technology and equipment.
This commercialization, including self-manufacturing of medical equipment, has
become a critical component of Care’s strategy for cost reduction.10 Relisys oper-
ates its own manufacturing plant near Hyderabad that meets international good
manufacturing practice (GMP) standards, with capacity to manufacture 200,000
stents and 120,000 diagnostic catheters annually. The ability of Indian firms to
self-manufacture medical equipment has played a key role in facilitating innova-
tion and cost reduction.
Relisys began by developing and manufacturing routine equipment, such as in-
travenous lines, central venous catheters, and cardiac catheterization guidewires,
allowing Care to minimize the costs to procure these products and thus further
cater to its target lower-middle-class patient population. Over time, Relisys has
improved internal research and development (R&D) capabilities to focus on
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higher-value technology, such as drug-eluting coronary stents. By starkly reduc-
ing the costs for stents, the major driver of pricing for percutaneous coronary in-
tervention in India, these innovations are expanding the market for cardiac ser-
vices for local lower-income populations.
Further organizational innovations that improve efficiency and increase access
to care include investing in information technology (IT) solutions for distance
care, such as telemedicine. Health care delivery models use trained workers from
the local community to gather primary data and relay this information to the ap-
propriate medical personnel, who may be hundreds or thousands of miles away.
Diagnostic services provided under this model include computed tomographic
(CT) scanning and echocardiography with real-time tele-interpretation. Not only
does this practice reduce the costs of providing care, it also eliminates the finan-
cial burden for rural Indians of traveling to urban areas for medical care.
 Engineering perspective on service management. Many practices derived
from the field of engineering, including continuous measurement and comparison of
data across facilities, are helping Indian companies provide better services. Some or-
ganizations, such as Care and Fortis, employ engineers to drive data management
systems within their facilities. Real-time monitoring of data allows many Indian
hospitals to track and benchmark costs of care by patient, by provider, by service,
and by other pertinent parameters. Data regarding variations from expected costs of
care are captured and evaluated to regularly refine their models of care delivery.
When he first started at Fortis, Daljit Singh, president of strategy and organiza-
tional development and a chemical engineer by training, noticed that there was sub-
stantial variation in clinical practice at Fortis. He had medical charts abstracted so
that he could understand the variation and then worked with the physicians to re-
view the data and reduce the variation in care.
The telemedicine technologies described above also support service manage-
ment. Care, for instance, uses its telemedicine systems for daily video conferences
among all facilities. This practice allows the hospitals to integrate data communi-
cation across facilities and analyze deviations from internal benchmarks.
This engineering focus enables Indian hospitals to continuously learn from and
improve their clinical services. Unlike the ubiquitous cost-benefit analyses that
pervade many U.S. hospitals, the orientation of the engineer maintains a clinical
focus on patient services while continuously evaluating quality.11
 Competing on quality, paying for mistakes. Because Indian hospitals com-
pete on both quality and price, hospital managers have instituted quality assurance
and improvement as integral to the business models. In a low-price setting, these
hospitals must maintain high-quality services to minimize adverse events, which
generally raise the costs of care. Acceptance of financial risk by hospitals within
capitated models for care delivery in India has added another driver for quality and
efficiency. This concept was aptly summarized by N. Krishna Reddy of Care Hospi-
tal, who stated that in this business model, “we can’t afford to have complications.”
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Pursuing Indian-Style Innovation In The United States
The U.S. health care system has obviously evolved very differently from the In-
dian hospitals we describe. Nonetheless, Indian achievements in attaining similar
outcomes at dramatically lower costs invite the question of whether U.S. hospitals
and health policymakers can learn from India’s remarkable experimentation,
entrepreneurialism, and technological progress.
 Growth of U.S. specialty hospitals. Lessons in business strategy and regula-
tory policy might be most applicable if we compare India’s growth in heart hospitals
to a similar explosion of interest in U.S. specialty hospitals.12 The growth of U.S. spe-
cialty hospitals was motivated by promises to deliver health care of higher quality
and at lower costs than general hospitals by specializing in specific offerings and ca-
pabilities, producing a higher volume of services and reducing overhead costs.13
The achievements of these market entrants, however, were mixed, and examin-
ing their impact offers a revealing window into competition in the U.S. health sec-
tor. First, the quality of care at specialty hospitals is in dispute. Some early indica-
tions that specialty hospitals had higher margins and lower costs were countered
by charges that the hospitals “cream-skimmed” patients who requested the most
lucrative procedures and presented the fewest complications.14 More significant,
there were concerns that instead of delivering on the promise of efficiency, these
hospitals achieved financial success merely by exploiting current hospital reim-
bursement policies. Since payment in the United States (whether by the govern-
ment or a private insurer) is not based on quality or clinical outcomes, part of the
specialty hospitals’ business models might have been careful patient selection.15
The most recent and detailed analysis by the Medicare Payment Advisory Com-
mission (MedPAC) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) in 2006 concluded that there is little evidence that an efficiency-based
business model is the one that actually developed.16
In sum, U.S. specialty hospitals seem to have evolved to seize financial opportu-
nities offered by an imperfectly regulated payment system, rather than to exploit
an opportunity for high-quality, lower-cost services. Whereas new heart hospi-
tals in India’s largely unregulated health services market have to compete on the
basis of price and quality, specialty hospitals in the United States do not appear to
compete on either basis. It is instructive to examine features of the U.S. regulatory
environment that have discouraged value-based competition and impeded the or-
ganizational innovation that is now shaping the Indian market.
 Medicare and insurance payment policies. U.S. reliance on Medicare reim-
bursement played an important role in the strategic development of specialty hospi-
tals. The diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment system forces innovators to find
an appropriate rate from existing DRGs, instead of receiving a payment appropriate
for the service rendered and the costs associated with it.
Reliance on DRG reimbursement can have several consequences. First, the
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DRG system can restrain price competition by sustaining overly compensated but
inefficient incumbents while diluting the cost advantages brought by innovations.
Second, the lengthy and cumbersome procedure to establish new DRGs can dis-
courage innovators with new business from entry because they will not be
matched with appropriate reimbursements in their early years. For example,
MedCath, a U.S.-based owner and operator of cardiac hospitals, waited ten years
before receiving a reimbursement scheme that was appropriate for its services. Fi-
nally, hospitals cannot price flexibly, as Indian private hospitals do, and thus do
not have incentives to find sustainable price points that are appropriate for differ-
ent market segments. Orchestrating cross-subsidies or flexible pricing could be
important for entrants trying to gain traction in a new market.
Moreover, there is no means for innovative providers to negotiate with the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to secure appropriate reimburse-
ment rates for novel procedures or new delivery models. Thus, even if the owners
of specialty hospitals want their organizations to evolve into a truly value-creating
business model, the means for them to do so has been lacking.17
Private insurance reimbursement can also impede price competition. Since in-
surers have difficulty meaningfully confronting providers that have market power,
insurance networks are often forced to include all of the clustered services that
dominant hospital chains offer, including all tertiary services that would normally
be targets by more-efficient entrants.18 Consequently, insurers do little to stimu-
late price competition or encourage entry in hospital submarkets where specialty
hospitals could increase value.19
The pervasiveness of insurance might also, although less directly, impede high-
quality care by requiring much administrative attention. In U.S. hospitals, admin-
istrators responsible for arranging insurance reimbursements are present
throughout the patient’s hospital stay. In Indian hospitals, however, the parallel
support personnel come out of the nation’s hospitality industry and are dedicated
to improving the patient’s comfort and satisfaction.
 The Stark Amendment. Section 1877 of the Social Security Act, first passed in
1989, prohibits physicians from referring Medicare beneficiaries for certain health
services to an entity with which the physician or a member of the physician’s imme-
diate family has a financial relationship. This legislation, known as the Stark
Amendment, designed to combat physician self-referral and Medicare abuse, was
expanded in 1993 and 1994 to cover a broader spectrum of health services, and the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003
specifically applied the prohibition to physicians’ ownership of and investment in-
terests in specialty hospitals. Although intended to address the challenge of physi-
cian oversight, these rules have contributed to a stifling of the development of physi-
cian-owned hospitals. They have thus deterred physicians’ investment in new
facilities and discouraged their involvement in corporate strategy, both of which
were beneficial in the Indian heart hospitals.
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Opposition to self-referral is also expressed by administrators of general hospi-
tals, because it channels their patients toward specialty hospitals. Political pres-
sure from hospital lobbyists (in addition to concerns over the efficiency of spe-
cialty hospitals and distrust of self-referral) led to a moratorium on payments to
specialty hospitals in 2005.20 Congress’s decision to block payment to market en-
trants largely quieted market competition—a windfall few U.S. incumbents would
dare request but a service that is not too unusual for health care providers—and
perhaps hurt a reasonable chance at meaningful innovation in hospital services.21
 Tort standards. U.S. negligence law requires that providers offer care that
meets a community standard.22 Because innovations, by definition, are deviations
from the community standard, they are vulnerable to being labeled negligent and
becoming the target of a legal suit. This vulnerability exposes innovators to liability
that does not threaten incumbent providers, who abide strictly by the status quo.
Moreover, although certain doctrines in negligence law have been known to hold
providers liable even when courts deem the community standard to be too low, no
such doctrine allows providers to escape liability by arguing that a widely held com-
munity standard is too high.23
Thus, tort law can lock in expensive and conventional practices and expose po-
tential disruptive innovators to liability. Note that malpractice law applies in
medical settings differently from the way product liability law applies in the in-
dustries studied by Christensen. In the Christensen model, innovations spawn
low-cost alternatives to incumbent products that are, initially, considered to be of
inferior quality. Medical malpractice law, however, penalizes innovation that can-
not match the quality of the current paradigm, even if the innovation offers cost
advantages and even if the innovation’s quality improves over time. Initial offerings
that do not meet a community standard will be deemed malpractice.
Indian accomplishments reveal how tort standards can impede sorely needed
innovation in the health sector. Many of the Indian successes have come out of ex-
perimentation, where Indian doctors and corporate strategists tried out new rou-
tines and where engineers continuously proposed possible improvements and
measured the quality-cost trade-offs for each trial. If U.S. tort law took costs into
account more explicitly, or were more tolerant of variations in approaches to high-
quality care, perhaps the law would be less discouraging of the experimentation
that is required to innovate.
Learning From India: Same-Quality Outcomes At A Tenth Of
The Cost
Once again, health care reform is atop the U.S. political agenda, along with the
oft-stated demands for cost reduction and quality improvement. What is striking
from this one study of a select group of Indian hospitals is that there are alterna-
tives in health care delivery that can achieve outcomes of the same quality at a
tenth of the cost. U.S. hospitals could learn from some of these successes, and
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policymakers should reexamine barriers to organizational innovation that prevent
U.S. entrepreneurs from moving in a similar direction.
Although most innovation-intensive industries have enjoyed a history of pro-
ducing new generations of industry leaders, offering dramatic improvements in
both capability and affordability, the U.S. health sector has not. Recent events in
India suggest that the U.S. regulatory environment, not just the nature of health
care itself, plays an important role. Indian innovations reveal that offering world-
class quality is not inconsistent with reducing costs.
The U.S. health sector, however, may soon resemble other innovation-intensive
industries in one important respect: it may find its industry leaders displaced by
Indian offerings. If dramatic cost differences persist between procedures per-
formed in Indian and U.S. hospitals, it might not be long before employers and in-
surers begin sending patients to India for treatment. Even with regulatory barri-
ers that weaken innovative entrants, U.S. providers and policymakers may realize
that those barriers only extend up to America’s borders and offer no protection
from the market forces exerting themselves beyond.
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